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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT-Dispute Over the United States Denial of a Visa to Yasir Arafat
On November 26, 1988, the United States denied a visa to Yasir
Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), when he sought to enter the United States
to attend the forty-third session of the United Nations (UN) in New
York. The denial rekindled a forty-year-old dispute between the
United States and the UN over the extent to which the United States
may, under the terms of the Agreement Between the United Nations
and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the
United Nations (Headquarters Agreement), restrict entry to persons
seeking to enter the country for UN business.
The Headquarters Agreement, enacted in 1947,1 establishes the
boundaries of the UN "headquarters district" in New York City and
allocates to the United States and the UN spheres of authority over
this district. 2 United States federal, state, and local laws apply within
the district except in the areas of UN control specified in the Headquarters Agreement. 3 The UN may promulgate regulations operative
1. Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 169(11), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 91 (1947), 11
U.N.T.S. 11 (1947), 61 Star. 756, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, authorized by S.J. Res. 144, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., Pub. L. No. 80-357, set out in 22 U.S.C. § 287 note (1982) [hereinafter
Headquarters Agreement]. Negotiations between the U.S. and the UN concerning a Permanent
Headquarters Agreement began in 1946. The resulting Agreement was signed by UN SecretaryGeneral Trygve Lie and U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall on June 26, 1947. See XVII
DEPT. OF ST. BuL. No. 418, at 27 (1947). Marshall passed the Agreement on to President
Truman, who transmitted it to Congress for final approval. See Letter from the Sec. of State to
President Truman (June 30, 1947), reprintedin 1 FOREIGN REL. L. U.S., at 43 (1947); Tile

President's Letter of Transmittal, reprintedin XVII DEPT. OF ST. BuLL. No. 419, at 78 (1947).
The State Department then drafted a joint resolution containing the text of the Headquarters
Agreement and additional provisions authorizing the President to bring it into effect. An
amendment to the resolution was added by the Senate and revised by the House of Represenratives. See Editorial Note, I FOREIGN REL. L. U.S. 45 (1947); see also
infra notes 11-14 and
accompanying text. The Headquarters Agreement was then passed by the U.S. as Senate Joint
Resolution 144, Public Law 80-357, on August 4, 1947. On October 31, 1947, the UN
General Assembly approved the Agreement, but the official text was that of the Headquarters
Agreement as signed by Lie and Marshall, without the additional provisions of Public Law 80357. See G.A. Res. 169(II), 11 U.N.T.S. 11, supra. The Headquarters Agreement was finally
brought into effect by an exchange of notes between UN Secretary-General Trygvc Lie and
Warren R. Austin, the U.S. representativ,, to the UN, on November 21, 1947. For the texts
of the notes see 11 U.N.T.S. 11, 39-<,. 947). Ambassador Austin's note stated that the U.S.
approved the Agreement "subject to :ne provisions of Public Law 357." Id. at 40. See also infra
note 17 and accompanying text.
2. The Headquarters Agreement describes the boundaries of the headquarters district as the
area of Manhattan bounded by Franklin D. Rooseveh Drive to the east, First Avenue to the
west, East Forty-Eighth Street to the north, and East Forty-Second Street to the south, along
with an easement over Roosevelt Drive. Headquarwrse Agreement, supra note 1, Anne 1.
3. Id. § 7(a), (b).
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within the headquarters district to provide for the execution of UN
functions. 4 If any United States federal, state, or local law is inconsistent with these regulations, the UN regulations are to prevail. 5 Any
dispute between the UN and the United States over whether a particular UN regulation is authorized by the Headquarters Agreement, or
whether a particular United States law is inconsistent with an authopanel pursuant
rized UN regulation, is to be resolved by an arbitration
6
to Section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement.
Four sections of the Headquarters Agreement pertain specifically to
the right of transit to and from the headquarters district for individuals
engaged in official UN business. Section 11 identifies five categories
of UN affiliates to whom the United States must grant entry.7 Section
12 provides that Section 11 privileges of entry apply without respect
to the state of relations between the United States and the governments
of UN affiliates enjoying entry privileges. 8 Section 13 provides that
United States immigration laws shall not interfere with Section 11
entry rights and that only the UN may control entry into the headquarters district. 9 Section 13 also affirms the United States' right to

4. Id. § 8. The UN established, for example, regulations regarding its social security system,
the practice of professional occupations within the headquarters district, and the hours of
operation for services, facilities, and retail establishments within the- headquarters district. See
UN SECRETARIAT, LEGAL DEPT., HANDBOOK ON THE LEGAL STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 558-61, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/3 (1952), amcitedin WHITE-

MAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 75 (1968).
5. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 1, § 8.
6. The section provides as follows:
Any dispute between the United Nations and the United States concerning the interpretation or application of this agreement or of any supplemental agreement, which is not
settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of settlement, shall be referred for final decision
to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be named by the Secretary-General, one to be
named by the Secretary of State of the United States, and the third to be chosen by the
two, or, if they should fail to agree upon a third, then by the President of the International
Court of Justice.
Id. § 2 l(a).
7. Section 11 provides that the U.S. "shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from
the headquarters district" of persons falling into any one of the following categories:
(1) representatives of Members or officials of the United Nations ... or the families of
such representatives or officials,
(2) experts performing missions for the United Nations....
(3) representatives of the press, or of radio, film or other information agencies, who have
been accredited by the United Nations . . . after consultation with the United States,
(4) representatives of nongovernmental organizations recognized by the United Nations
for the purpose of consultation . . . , or
(5) other persons invited to the headquarters district by the United Nations . . . on
official business.

Id. § 11.
8. Id. § 12.
9. Id. § 13(a), (f). Section 13 also provides that "[w]hen visas are required for persons referred
to in [Section 11], they shall be granted without charge and as promptly as possible." Id.
§ 13(a).
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control the entry of UN aliens into United States territory outside the
headquarters district, and grants the United States the right to deport
aliens from the headquarters district in the event of an abuse of UN
residence privileges. 10 Finally, Section 6 of Public Law 80-357, the
United States' Congressionally-enacted version of the Headquarters
Agreement," provides that nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to abridge the United States' right:
to safeguard its own security and completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of the United States other than
the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity . . .and
such areas as it is reasonably necessary to traverse in transit
between the same and foreign countries. 12
Disagreement between the United States and the UN over the effect
and meaning of Section 6 surrounded the implementation of the
Headquarters Agreement in 1947. The Senators who originally drafted
Section 6 proposed it as simply a clarification of the United States'
powers of restriction and deportation set forth in Section 13.13 The
House of Representatives' revision of the Senate proposal, however,
reflected an intent to reserve for the United States greater control over
10. Section 13 provides that, despite Section 11 entry privileges, deportation proceedings
may be instituted with the approval of the Secretary of State after consultation with the UN if
an alien abuses UN residence privileges in activities "outside his official capacity." Id. § 13(b).
The section further provides that the U.S. retains full control and authority over the entry of
persons or property into U.S. territory "[eixcept as provided above in this section and in the
General Convention." Id. § 13(d).
11. The Joint Resolution containing the Headquarters Agreement, ice Jupra note 1, contains
the full text of the Agreement followed by five additional sections, referred to as Sections 2
through 6 of Public Law 80-357. 61 Star. 756, at 766-67, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 29-30.
Sections 2 through 5 were drafted by the State Department to enable the U.S. to effectuate the
provisions of the Headquarters Agreement. Section 6 was added by Congress to secure the
support of legislators who feared that the Headquarters Agreement might be used as a device
for evading U.S. immigration laws or endangering national security. See Comment Paper,Agreement
between
the United Nations and the United States Regarding the United Nations Headquarters:Report
of the Secretary-General(August 6, 1947), reprintedin 1 FOREIGN REL. L. U.S., at 49 (1947).
See also infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
12. 61 Star. 756, at 767, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 30. See supra notes 1 and 11.
13. The Senate Report on the Headquarters Agreement, in which Section 6 was proposed as
an amendment, noted that U.S. obligations under the Headquarters Agreement inevitably
required the admission of aliens who "would not normally be admissible" under U.S. immigration
laws, and that this was a necessary condition for the UN to maintain its headquarters in the
U.S. S. Rep. No. 559, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5-6 (1947). The Report concluded that the
U.S. rights of restriction and deportation "adequately protect" national security, and explained
that the purpose of Section 6 was to clarify these rights and reaffirm that the U.S. was under
no obligation to amend its immigration laws "except to give effect to the rights referred to [in
Sections 11 and 13 of the Headquarters Agreement]." Id. at 6. As written by the Senate, the
proposed Section 6 did not include the language "to safeguard its own security," which was
inserted by the House of Representatives. See Editorial Note, 1 FOREIGN REL. L. U.S. 45
(1947).
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alien entry. 14 The UN Secretary-General asked the UN Subcommittee
considering the United States' version of the Headquarters Agreement
to take particular note of Section 6.15 The UN Subcommittee's meetings resulted in heated debate and a decision to postpone consideration
of Section 6 until circumstances demanded a resolution as to its legal
effect. 16 In the meantime, the United States interpreted Section 6 as
giving it the right to deny entry to UN affiliates for security reasons. 17
14. The House of Representatives explained the insertion of the clause "to safeguard its own
security" as language meant to go "along with" the right to control entry into territories outside
the headquarters district as a "right of self-defense . . . underlying all American policy." H.R.
Rep. No. 1093, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 11 (1947). According to the House Report, the
clause merely "[made] explicit what is a premise of such an agreement in any case." Id. The
Report gave no specific examples of the use of this right.
15. The Secretary-General's report stated in pertinent part:
Both the joint resolution and Public Law 357 refer to the interpretation placed on the
(Headquarters] Agreement by Congress, in particular the right of the United States to
control the entry of aliens into the territory of the United States. In this connection it
would appear desirable to draw the General Assembly's attention to Section 6 of Public
Law 357.
2 U.N. GAOR C.6 Annex 11, at 327, U.N. Doc. A/371 (1947).
16. See U.N. Unclassified Summary No. 1029 (Oct. 16, 1947), cited in 1 FOREIGN REL. L.
U.S., at 63 n. 1 (1947). The U.S. representative objected to statements in the UN Subcommittee's report that the UN need not "take official cognizance of" Public Law 80-357, that the
Headquarters Agreement "alone contained the obligations between the parties," and that "the
actual contents of the resolution of Congress was a domestic matter for the U.S." Id.; see also
Letter from the Sec. of State at the U.N. to the Acting Sec. of State (October 14, 1947), id.
at 61. Nevertheless, the final report of the Subcommittee stated that the Subcommittee had
"confined its study to the text of the Agreement and compared it with the draft Agreement." 2
U.N. GAOR C.6 Annex 11a, at 340, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/172 (1947). The UN then approved
each of the reports. recommending approval of the Headquarters Agreement. See 2 U.N. GAOR
C.6 (53d mtg.), at 105, (1947) (Sixth Committee's approval of Subcommittee's report); 2 U.N.
GAOR Annex 9b, at 1519, U.N. Doc. A/427 (1947) (Sixth Committee's report to General
Assembly); 2 U.N. GAOR (101st plen. meg.) at 467 (1947) (General Assembly's approval of
Sixth Committee's report).
17. This position was established by a State Department interpretation of the language of
Section 6 in light of its legislative history. See Memorandum by the Asst. Sec. of State for U.N.
Affairs to the Sec. of State (February 6, 1952), reprintedin 3 FOREIGN REL. L. U.S., at 198
(1952-1954). The State Department insisted that the legislative history, see supra notes 13 and
14, indicated that the first part of Section 6, "to safeguard its own security," should be read
disjunctively, thus reserving to the U.S. the separate rights of safeguarding its security and of
controlling the entrance of aliens into U.S. territories other than the headquarters district and
its immediate vicinity. See Memorandum by the Asst. Sec. of State for U.N. Affairs to the See.
of State, supra at 200. Based upon this construction, the State Department contended that the
U.S. could deny UN aliens access to the headquarters district for security reasons, and for any
reason deny UN aliens access to areas outside the headquarters district. Id. at 200-01.
Moreover, the State Department argued that the UN could not assert that Section 6 had no
effect since the U.S. note that effectuated the Headquarters Agreement, see supra note 1, stated
clearly that the U.S. authorized the Agreement "subject to the provisions of Public Law 357."
See Memorandum by the Asst. Sec. of State for U.N. Aftairs to the Sec. of State, supra at 201
(emphasis in citation). To preserve the meaning of this phrase, the U.S. representative to the
UN Subcommittee had insisted on the deletion of language in the final report stating that "the
notes exchanged for the purposes of bringing the Headquarters Agreement into force should be
limited to clearly effecting this purpose and should not contain any other matter having any
effect by way of interpretation or otherwise on the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement."
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The UN, on the other hand, maintained that, if Section 6 had any
effect at all, it merely confirmed the United States' right to control
the entry of UN affiliates outside the headquarters district. 18
The first occasion to resolve the issue arose in 1953, when the
United States denied entry visas to representatives of two nongovernmental organizations seeking to participate in UN meetings.19 The
See Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Asst. Legal Adviser for U.N. Affairs: Part I
(April 15, 1953), reprintedin 3 FOREIGN REL. L. U.S., at 262, 263 (1952-1954); ie also Letter
from the U.S. Rep. at the U.N. to the Acting Sec. of State (October 14, 1947), reprinted in 1
FOREIGN REL. L. U.S., at 61 (1947). The U.S. representative also insisted repeatedly that the
U.S. could not authorize the Headquarters Agreement without the additional provisions of
Public Law 80-357. See Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Asst. Legal Adviser for
U.N. Affairs, supra at 263.
18. See Memorandum by the Asst. Sec. of State for U.N. Affairs to the Sec. of State, supra
note 17, at 201. When confronted with the U.S. interpretation of Section 6 in reference to the
entry of a Czechoslovakian delegate in 1952, the UN Secretary-General told the U.S. that if
the U.S. had intended Section 6 to constitute a reservation to the entry rights granted UN
affiliates, the reservation had neither been considered nor accepted by the UN. See Letter from
the Secretary-General of the U.N. to the Acting U.S. Rep. at the U.N. (June 16, 1952),
reprinted in 3 FOREIGN REL. L. U.S., at 213-14 (1952-1954). Accordingly, the SecretaryGeneral maintained, whether or nor Section 6 conditioned obligations under the Headquarters
Agreement was a question for the UN. Id. at 214.
An internal U.S. response to this argument suggested a modification of the U.S. position.
See Memorandum by Albert F. Bender, Jr., of the U.S. Mission at the U.N. (July 1, 1952),
id. at 214-19. The memorandum first noted that settlement of the issue was a question not for
the UN, but for arbitration, if necessary, under Section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement. Id.
at 218. The memorandum then gave three reasons why arbitration might support the UN
position over that of the State Department. First, the U.S. representative to the UN Subcommittee studying the Headquarters Agreement never explicitly stated the U.S. intention to
condition its Section 11 and Section 13 obligations by the language of Section 6 or Ambassador
Austin's note. Id. at 217. Second, the UN was unaware of the legislative history of the section
and therefore could not be bound by it. Id. at 218. Third, a plain reading of Section 6, without
the interpretative aid of the legislative history, supported the U.N. position. The modifying
clause "completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of the United States otber
than the Headquarters District and its immediate vicinity" was contained within the same
sentence as the affirmation of the right of the U.S. "to safeguard its own security." Id. at 218
(emphasis in citation). See also supra text accompanying note 12. In light of the specific clause
referring to U.S. control over the entry of aliens, the memorandum noted, it would be "unusual
statutory construction" to interpret the immediately preceding "safeguard its own security"
clause as referring to the same topic. Indeed, the "safeguard its own security" clause could be
given full effect if read as relating to any of a number of other security issues raised by the
Headquarters Agreement. Memorandum by Albert F. Bender, Jr., of the U.S. Mission at the
'U.N., supraat 218-19. The memorandum also urged that, in light of its importance, the issue
be quickly resolved with the UN Secretary-General "by negotiation if possible, or failing that,
by arbitration." Id. at 216.
19. The two were, respectively, a representative of the Women's International Democratic
Federation (WIDF), designated by the WIDF to attend the seventh session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, and a representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU), designated by the WFTU to attend the fifteenth session of the UN Economic and
Social Council. See Memorandum by the U.N. Legal Department, Admission of Representatims of
Non-governmental OrganizationsEnjoying Consultative Status, 15 U.N. ESCOR Annexes (Agenda
Item 34) at 2, U.N. Doc. E/2397 (1953) [hereinafter UN Legal Department Memorandum];
see also Letter from the U.S. Rep. at the U.N. to the Dept. of State (March 25, 1953), reprinted
in 3 FOREIGN REL. L. U.S., at 250-51 (1952-1954); Memorandum by the Asst. Legal Adviser
for UN Affairs to the Legal Adviser (March 26, 1953), id. at 252-54; Letter from the Dept. of
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United States invoked Section 6 to explain its position, stating that
the denials comported with the right reserved in that section to
safeguard national security. 20 The UN Legal Department responded
that Section 6 neither provided nor implied such a right, and that if
the United States had intended such a reservation, it had never brought
the matter before the UN for consideration or acceptance. 21 Even if
the United States had intended a reservation in Section 6, the UN
maintained, the section's language could refer only to the United
States' right to control entry into territory other than the headquarters
22
district, its immediate vicinity, and the necessary area of transit.
Finally, the UN concluded that if the United States were to adhere to
its position regarding Sectiotn 6, the matter should be resolved by
means of the arbitration procedure outlined in Section 21.23
An internal State Department memorandum set forth the United
States' position. 24 First, the State Department maintained that, in
light of the 1947 UN Subcommittee debates and the UN SecretaryGeneral's report alerting the Subcommittee to Section 6,25 the UN
had been "well aware of" the Section 6 reservation. 26 The State Department argued that the UN "fully considered" the section before
implementing the Headquarters Agreement, and therefore the UN
had fully accepted the reservation. 27 The State Department further
insisted that even if the UN had not expressly accepted the reservation
by the time it implemented the Headquarters Agreement, continued
application of the Agreement for over five years constituted the equiv-

the Legal Adviser to the Deputy U.S. Rep. at the U.N. (March 28, 1953), id. at 254. See also
Liang, The Question of Access to the United Nations Headquartersof Representatives of Nongovernmental
Organizationsin Consultative Status, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 434 (1954).
20. UN Legal Department Memorandum, supra note 19, para. 3. See also XXVIII DEPr. OF
ST. BULL. No. 722, at 625 (1953).
21. UN Legal Department Memorandum, supra note 19, para. 9. The UNLegal Department
insisted that principles of international law required any such "qualifying declaration" to have
been explicitly agreed to by the UN if it were to have any force. Id., para. 10.
22. Id., para. 11 (emphasis in citation). Some UN members disagreed with the Legal
Department's contention that Section 6 had no legal effect on the Headquarters Agreement. See
supra note 21 and accompanying text. They concurred, however, with the UN interpretation of
the section. See 15 U.N. ESCOR (686th mtg.) (Agenda Item 34), at 83-85, U.N. Doc. E/
SR.686 (1953). UN debate over the issue ended in a decision to leave the matter for negotiation
between the U.S. and the Secrerary-General. See 15 U.N. ESCOR (687th mtg.) (Agenda Item
34), at 89, U.N. Doc. E/SR.687 (1953).
23. U.N. Legal Department Memorandum, supra note 19, para. 14. For the text of the
arbitration provision, see supra note 6.
24. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Asst. Legal Adviser for UN Affairs: Part I,
supra note 17.
25. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
26. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Asst. Legal Adviser for UN Affairs: Part I,
supra note 17, at 263.
27. Id. at 264.
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alent of formal acceptance. 28 Regarding the interpretation of Section
6, the State Department argued that the section's legislative history
evinced a clear Congressional desire to retain some United States
control over alien entry into the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity. 29 Thus, according to the State Department, Section 6
30
reserved the United States this right.
The State and Justice Departments reiterated the United States'
position in a subsequent study of the issue, 31 but Henry Cabot Lodge,
the United States Ambassador to the UN, suggested that it was unwise
for the United States steadfastly to adhere to its position. 32 Lodge
insisted that Secretary-General Hammarskjold made out "a persuasive
case" on the interpretation of Section 6.33 Hammarskjold, however,
was willing to agree to some procedure designed to protect the United
States against potential security threats. 34 Lodge therefore suggested
that the United States abandon legal debate in favor of "lasting and
practical" solutions to the problem.35 Lodge then served as liaison
between Hammarskjold and the State Department in negotiations to
36
reach an agreement.
Hammarskjold summarized the result of the negotiations in a State
Department-approved report 37 and a subsequent oral address to the
UN. 38 First, the negotiations had "fully reaffirmed" the substance of
28. Id. at 265. Any other contention, according to the State Department, would compel the
unsettling conclusion that there had been no meeting of the minds between the U.S. and the
UN, and that the parties therefore never reached any agreement at all regarding the UN
Headquarters. Id.
29. Id. at 264-65. This argument apparently disregarded the earlier U.S. reappraisal of the
issue. See Memorandum by Alfred F. Bender, Jr., of the U,S. Mission at the U.N., jupra note
18.
30. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Asst. Legal Adviser for UN Affairs: Parr I,
.rupra note 17, at 264-65.
31. See Memorandum Prepared Jointly by the Dept. of State and the Dept. of Justice (May
14, 1953), reprintedin 3 FOREIGN REL. L. U.S., at 275-78 (1952-1954) [hereinafter Joint
Memorandum].
32. ,See Memorandum by the U.S. Rep. at the U.N. (May 19, 1953), reprinted in 3 FOREIGN
REL. L. U.S., at 278-79 (1952-1954).
33. Hammarskjold reiterated to Lodge the UN position on Section 6 presented to the U.S.
by Secretary-General Lie in 1952. See supra note 18. Hammarskjold also pointed out that the
Section 6 legislative history, seesupra notes 13 and 14, did not clearly support the U.S. position.
See Memorandum by the U.S. Rep. at the U.N., supra note 32, at 279.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. For correspondence between Lodge, the State Department, and the UN, see 3 FOREIGN
REL. L. U.S. 278-305 (1952-1954).
37. Progress Report by the Secretary-General, Question of Aeeis toHeadquartersof Repreentatvv
of Non-governmental Organizations, 16 U.N. ESCOR Annexes (Agenda Item 33) at 1, U.N. Doe.
E12492 (1953) [hereinafter Progress Report by the Secretary-General].
38. Oral Statement by the Secretary-General, Question of Access to Headquartersof Representatitvs
of Non-governmental Organizations, 16 U.N. ESCOR Annexes (743rd mtg.) (Agenda Item 33) at
2, U.N. Doc. E/2501 (1953) [hereinafter Oral Statement by the Secretary-General].
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the Headquarters Agreement in that the United States had admitted
its obligation under the Headquarters Agreement to grant visas to
aliens on official UN business. 39 Unique cases, however, perhaps unforeseen and unaccounted for during the drafting of the Headquarters
Agreement, might present compelling reasons for allowing the United
States to exceed the scope of its powers as defined by the Headquarters
Agreement and deny entry to potentially dangerous aliens. 40 According
to Hammarskjold, such denial would be appropriate when, first, "clear
and convincing evidence" showed that a UN affiliate sought entry for
purposes outside the scope of his UN business, and, second, the United
States believed that that person's entry would be "prejudicial to the
national security." 4 1 In these cases, full consultation between the
United States and the UN would precede any final decision. 42 Specifically, such cases would be considered at "the highest levels" of the
United States government; decisions would be taken "in due time" to
allow the UN to consider and react to the decisions; and the SecretaryGeneral would be supplied, to the extent possible, with information
and evidence supporting the United States' decision. 43 In the event of
UN disagreement with a United States decision to deny entry, the
arbitration provision remained fully available. 44 This arrangement admittedly left to future decision the particular outcome of each indi45
vidual case.
Some thirty-five years after this compromise, on November 25,
1988, Yasir Arafat submitted to the United States Embassy in Tunisia
an application for a visa to enter the United States in order to attend
46
the forty-third session of the UN General Assembly in New York.
39. Oral Statement by the Secretary-General, supra note 38, para. 4.
40. Progress Report by the Secretary-General, supra note 37, paras. 4, 6.
41. Id., para. 4. Hammarskjold pointed out that, from the UN point of view as well, entry
should not be granted any UN affiliate where clear and convincing evidence showed the affiliate's
"bad faith" intention "to use his trip as a cover for activities against [U.S.] security." Id., para.

6.
42. Id., para. 5.
43. Oral Statement by the Secretary-General, supra note 38, para. 11. Hammarskjold told
the UN, however, that such application of the Headquarters Agreement, even in appropriate
cases, was beyond the power of the Secretary-General, and would require authorization by the
UN. Id., para. 8; Progress Report by the Secretary-General, supra note 37, para. 6.
44. Oral Statement by the Secretary-General, supra note 38, paras. 8, 10.
45. Id., para. 9. Hammarskjold stated that he did not consider the negotiations "finally
concluded," but felt that further action was unnecessary until "concrete questions" arose. Id.
The U.S. viewed this entire procedure as merely a temporary one, to last only as long as
Hammarskjold and Lodge held their respective positions. New arrangements were to be made
with new individuals. See Joint Memorandum, supra note 31, at 276.

46. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1988, at 3, col. 1. Arafat's application was preceded by a formal
request submitted to the U.S. by the UN on November 9, 1988. See id., Nov. 10, 1988, at

All, col. 1. Arafat sought entry in order to participate in the UN General Assembly's scheduled
discussions of the Middle East question, where he intended to explain the proclamation of an
independent Palestinian state and other decisions reached by the Palestine National Council in
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One day later, the State Department issued a statement announcing
its decision to deny Arafat's visa request. 47 The ensuing debate revealed
that the 1953 negotiations had brought the United States and the UN
no closer to a lasting resolution of the Section 6 dispute.
In its statement, the State Department first admitted the United
States' obligation under the Headquarters Agreement to permit the
entry of individuals participating in UN business. 48 The State Department added that Congress had, however, reserved the right to
deny entry to UN-affiliated aliens if protection of United States national security warranted such a measure. 49 The State Department then
explained that United States law prohibits PLO members from entering the United States by virtue of their affiliation with a terrorist
organization, 5" and that the Secretary of State may recommend to the
Attorney-General that the prohibition against a particular PLO member be waived. 51 In acknowledgment of the United States' obligation
under the Headquarters Agreement, the State Department continued,
such waivers have been issued to PLO members "as a routine practice"
since 1974, when the PLO Permanent Observer Mission to the UN

Algieis on November 13-14, 1988. See id., Nov. 10, 1988, at All, col. 1; id., Nov. 15,
1988, at Al, col. 6; id., Nov. 16, 1988, at Al, col. 6; id., Nov. 23, 1988, at A14, col. I.

47. Statement on the Determination by the Secretary of State on Visa Application of Yasir Arafat,
reprintedin N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1988, at A5, col. 1 [hereinafter State Department Statement].
48. Id., para. 1.

49. Id., para. 2.
50. Id., para. 3. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 specifies categories of aliens
ineligible to receive visas to enter the U.S. One category covers aliens who the U.S. has reason
to believe seek entry "solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be
prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United
States." Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982).
Another category covers all aliens belonging to any organization that advocates "the duty,
necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers ... of any
. . . organized government," "the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property," or
"sabotage." Id. § 212(a)(28)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(F) (1982). PLO members could presumably be denied entry into the United States under either one of these categories. Bit lee infra
note 51 and accompanying text.
Recently, the U.S. elaborated on these categories in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, affirming "the existing authority of the executive branch" to deny
admission to any alien "for reasons of foreign policy or national security," and any alien "who
• . . has engaged, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, in a terrorist
activity or is likely to engage after entry in a terrorist activity." 8 U.S.C. § 1182 note (Supp.
V 1987).
51. State Department Statement, supra note 47, para. 3. An alien ineligible for a visa under
an excluded category, see supra note 50, may be admissible "after approval by the Attorney
General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular officer." Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982). Such a waiver is not
possible, however, for aliens declared ineligible under section 212(a)(27) of the Act. See supra
note 50. If PLO members are determined ineligible to enter the country under one of the
excluded categories, they must be classified under section 212(a)(28)(F) in order to enjoy the
possibility of waiver.
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was established in New York. 52 In the present case, the Secretary of
State would not recommend a waiver for Arafat in light of "convincing
evidence" of the PLO's continued engagement in terrorist activities
and Arafat's responsibility for these activities as PLO Chairman.5 3 The
State Department concluded that the United States may deny entry
to Arafat under the Section 6 security reservation since the PLO
"through certain of its elements" has employed terrorism against
Americans; as Chairman of the PLO, Arafat is an accessory to such
terrorism; and "[t]errorism and those involved in it present a serious
threat to our national security and to the lives of American citizens." 54
The UN Legal Counsel presented objections to the United States'
decision the next day, 55 with reasoning analogous to that employed
by the UN Legal Department in 1953.56 The UN first noted that
Arafat's visa request in no way differed from "the normal PLO visa
requests," and that Arafat's explicit purpose as stated in the visa
request was to participate in the work of the forty-third session of the
UN in his capacity as Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee.5 7
According to the UN, the request thus fell squarely under Sections
11, 12, and 13 of the Headquarters Agreement. 58 Section 13(d) confirmed the "unrestricted right" of persons mentioned in Section 11 to
52. State Department Statement, supra note 47, para. 4. Arafat himself must have enjoyed
this right when he came to New York to address the UN General Assembly in 1974, although
the visa issued tc him then allowed Arafat to visit the U.S. "for business purposes." N.Y.
Times, Nov. 27, 1988, at 4, cols. 1-2. The 1974 UN invitation to the PLO is contained in
G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) (Agenda Item 108) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974). For information regarding Arafat's 1974 visit, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1974, at 4,
col. 4; id., Nov. 13, 1974, at 1, col. 1; id., Nov. 14, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
53. State Department Statement, supra note 47, paras. 5-7. The statement included as this
evidence "a series of operations by Force 17 and the Hawari organizations," two PLO-affiliated
groups, and "the presence at the (November 14, 1988] Algiers session of the Palestine National
Council ...

of Abu Abbas, a member of the Executive Committee of the [PLO] ...

convicted

...of the (1986] murder of an American citizen, Mr. Leon Klinghoffer" Id., para. 5. See also
N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1988, at A14, col. 1,
54. State Department Statement, supra note 47, paras. 6-7. In a subsequent statement to
the UN in support of the U.S. decision, a U.S. spokesperson invoked not only "the United
States security reservation to the Headquaters Agreement" but also precedent. See Statement by
the U.S. Rep. to the Committee on Relations with the Host Country, U.S. Mission to the UN
[USUNI Press Release 154-(88), Nov. 28, 1988 (available from the UN Office of Legal Affairs).
Noting "United Nations acquiescence" to visa denials to UN affiliates in 1954, 1981, 1982,
1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1988, the representative asserted that "United Nations practice
confirms that the [U.S.] is not expected to accept the entry of every individual to the Headquarters District." Id,, paras. 5, 7. These prior visa denials, about which no apparent public
record exists, involved, inter alia, a UN designate from Iran convicted of conspiring to kill the
Shah of Iran, and Iranians involved in the 1979-1980 hostage incident at the U.S. embassy in
Tehran. See id., para. 5.
55. 43 U.N. GAOR
(Agenda Item 137) at
- , U.N. Doc. AIC.6/43/7 (1988)
[hereinafter UN Legal Counsel Statement].
56. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
57. UN Legal Counsel Statement, supra note 55, para. 2.
58. Id.
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enter the United States for the purpose of proceeding to the headquarters district since it granted the United States full control over
the entry of aliens into the United States "[e]xcept as provided above
in this section and in the General Convention." 59 Section 6, the UN
insisted, gave the United States no right to bar entry of UN participants to the headquarters district, since the clause affirmed undiminished United States control over entry of aliens into territories "other
than the Headquartersdistrict and its immediate vicinity." 60 Since Arafat's
visa application requested entry into the headquarters district only,
the UN concluded, the request fell precisely within Section 11 and
the Section 13(d) exception, and within the area left open by Section
6.61 The "so-called security reservation" to the Headquarters Agree62
ment thus did not apply.
Moreover, the UN maintained that the denial of Arafat's visa did
not comport with the procedure agreed upon in the 1953 talks between
Hammarskjold and the United States for possible "security exceptions." 63 The United States never consulted with the UN SecretaryGeneral before making the decision." Nor did the State Department
allege that Arafat's presence in the country would itself present a
security threat. 65 The UN thus concluded that the United States was
66
filly obliged to grant Arafat a visa.
Both the immediate dispute and the much larger disagreement over
the effect of the Section 6 provision on the Headquarters Agreement
remain unresolved. The arguments of the UN and the United States
in 1988 in fact echoed precisely those employed by each some forty
years ago. The compromise procedure outlined in 1953 to manage
difficult cases was not followed in the case of Arafat; that procedure
59. Id., para. 4. That is, Section 13(d) explicitly reaffirmed the provision of 13(a) that U.S.
law "shall not be applied in such a manner as to interfere with the privileges referred to in
Section 11." See supra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text.

60. Id., para. 6 (emphasis in citation).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

para. 7.
paras. 3, 5.
paras. 8, 11. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
para. 8. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
para. 11. Thus, the UN contended, the standard agreed upon in 1953 for possible

security exceptions had not been met, since there was neither clear and convincing evidence that
Arafat sought entry to the U.S. for purposes outside the scope of his UN activities, nor an
allegation that his presence in the United States "would per se in any way threaten [U.S.]
security." Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 41.
66. Id., para. 12. The UN Legal Counsel also objected to the statement of the U.S.

Representative to the Committee on Relations with the Host Country, see supra note 54, that
the UN had acquiesced in prior visa denials. The Legal Counsel argued that the UN had not
acquiesced in the denials but had chosen nor to insist "where the requesting state, for reasons

of its own, did not pursue the matter." Id., para. 10. The UN also maintained that its
positions
regarding both the U.S. obligation to grant visas and the "so-called security reservation" had
"at all times been perfectly clear to the [U.S.]." Id.
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appears all but forgotten. Even the Section 21 arbitration option
remains unexercised in efforts to settle the dispute. Rather, both the
United States and the UN have permitted the disagreement to persist
instead of seeking a final resolution concerning exactly how and under
what circumstances the United States may deny visas to UN affiliates.
The Arafat visa denial was only a step towards greater disagreement.
The United States relied on the "security reservation," which was
added to the Headquarters Agreement to be invoked in cases of clear
threats to national security, in a case that may not have warranted it.
The United States' decision appeared supported less by security concerns than by United States policy regarding the PLO-policy expressed in the State Department's explanation of Arafat's visa denial 67
and reflected in the broader political milieu. 6 The failure of the United
States and the UN to resolve the underlying legal issue had thus paved
the way for an overtly political result. In response, the UN could only
"deplore" the United States' decision and move the General Assembly
to Geneva in order to accommodate Arafat's speech. 69 This is far from
a practical solution.
67. The State Department statement asserted that "[a]ll
parties" must "demonstrate their
desire to make peace," "adhere to internationally accepted principles and norms," and "renounce
violence and terrorism" in order to be participants in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
State Department Statement, supra note 47, para. 8.
68. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Jupra note 50,
included an Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) declaring, inter alia, that the PLO isa terrorist organization and that the establishment or maintenance of any office in the U.S. funded or directed
by the PLO or itsconstituents isunlawful. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (Supp. V 1987). On
March 21, 1988, the day the ATA took effect, the U.S. brought an action in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York seeking an injunction to close the PLO Permanent
Observer Mission to the UN in New York. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization,
695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The court ruled against the U.S., holding that the ATA
could not override the U.S. obligation under the Headquarters Agreement to "refrain from
impeding the functions" of the PLO Observer Mission. Id. at 1466.
In the fall
of 1988, 51 Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State George Shultz urging him
to deny Arafat a visa until the PLO renounced terrorism and accepted Israel's right to exist.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1988, at A8, col. 3; id., Nov. 10, 1988, at All, col. 1; id., Nov. 23,
1988, at A14, col. 1. In his response, Shultz declared he had "no desire whatever to see Arafat
in the U.S." Id., Nov. 9, 1988, at A8, col. 3; see also
id., Nov. 10, 1988, at All, col. 1; id.,
Nov. 23, 1988, at A14, col. 1. American officials were also reported to have said that a PLO
decision to renounce terrorism could enhance Arafat's chances of getting a visa. Id., Nov. 9,
1988, at A8, col. 3. The State Department Legal Adviser for UN Affairs was said to have
advised Shultz that the decision whether or not to grant Arafat a visa was essentially "a policy
call." Id., Nov. 26, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
On December 14, 1988, in response to the PLO's renunciation of terrorism and acceptance
of Israel's right to exist, the U.S. reversed long-standing policy and opened up a dialogue with
the PLO. Id., Dec. 15, 1988, at Al, col. 6. Then, on March 8, 1989, the U.S. granted visas
to three PLO members seeking to attend a weekend conference on Middle East peace at Columbia
University in New York. Id., March 9, 1989, at A8, col. 5.
69. See G.A. Res. 43/48, 43 U.N. GAOR
(Agenda Item 137) at
-,
U.N.
Doc. A/RES/43/48 (1988) (deploring U.S. decision to deny Arafat visa); G.A. Res. 43/49, 43
U.N. GAOR
(Agenda Items 137, 138) at
-,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/49 (1988)
(UN to reconvene in Geneva). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1988, at A6, col. 1; id., Dec. 3,
1988, at 1, col. 1.
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The dispute should perhaps be submitted for arbitration in accordance with Section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement. If it were, the
sound UN interpretation of Section 6 might well be too late; the
United States has a powerful argument that forty years of practice
70
confirm its right to deny entry to UN aliens for security reasons.
Whatever the outcome, the issue should be resolved once and for all.
Leaving it unsettled only guarantees confrontation whenever the UN
disagrees with United States decisions to deny entry to UN affiliates.
Moreover, as the Arafat case suggests, failure to resolve the issue could
invite a steady erosion of the broad rights of alien access to the UN
originally intended in the Headquarters Agreement. Such erosion
would undermine the very function of the UN as an open forum for
discussion among all members of the international community.
S. Sadiq Reza

70. Nations are generally thought to be bound by "customary international law" resulting
from "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 102 (1987). A law thus formed "is not binding on a state that declares its dissent from the
principle during its development," id., comment b, but acquiescence may bind the silent party,
Id., comment d.

